This appendix contains a description of the model, the priors, and estimates of all the parameters for the paper Evolving Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix in the United States published in the American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 2012.
The Model
The model used in this paper is a small size DSGE similar to the one used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , augmented with a …scal block and a series of additional features as habit persistence and in ‡ation indexation.
The representative household maximizes the following utility function: 
subject to the budget constraint:
where D t stands for dividends paid by the …rms, C t is consumption, h t is hours, W t is the real wage, T t stands for taxes, T R t stands for transfers, and C A s represents the average level of consumption in the economy. The parameter captures the degree of external habit. The preference shock e d s evolves according to an AR(1) process:
Each of the monopolistically competitive …rms face a downward-sloping demand curve:
The parameter 1= is the elasticity of substitution between two di¤erentiated goods. The …rms take as given the general price level, P t , and level of real activity, Y t . Whenever a …rm wants to change its price, it faces quadratic adjustment costs represented by an output loss:
where t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate that prevailed in the previous period.
Labor is the only input in a linear production function:
where total factor productivity A t evolves according to an exogenous process:
e a t = a e a t 1 + a;t
The Central Bank moves the FFR according to the rule:
where R is the steady-state (gross) nominal rate, Y t is the target for output, is the target level for gross in ‡ation, and sp t is a hidden variable that determines the regime in place at time t.
Total government purchases represent a fraction t of total output and it is equally divided among the J di¤erent goods. We de…ne g t = 1=(1 t ) and we assume that e g t = ln(g t =g ) follows an AR(1) process (this assumption is relaxed in Bianchi and Ilut (2011) ):
Federal expenditure, i.e. the sum of federal government expenditure and transfers, (as a fraction of GDP and in deviations from the steady state) follows an exogenous process: The Government budget constraint is given by:
where b t and G t are the debt to GDP ratio and the gross GDP per capita growth rate, respectively. R b t 1;t is the return on government bonds between period t 1 and period t:
where x i represents the fraction of government bonds with maturity i. The maturity structure is assumed to be constant over time. for in ‡ation and debt are assumed to be constant over time. What changes is the strength with which the Government tries to pursue its goals, not the goals themselves. This is in line with the idea that policy makers might …nd high in ‡ation or high debt acceptable under some circumstances, perhaps in order to preserve output stability, but not desirable in itself. Agents in the model know the probability of moving across regimes and they use this information when forming expectations. The probability of moving across regimes depends only on the regime that is in place at time t. Heteroskedasticity is modelled as an independent Markov-switching process:
Solving the MS-DSGE model
First order conditions are derived and all the variables are then rescaled in order to obtain stationarity. The model is then linearized with respect to taxes, government expenditure (e t ), and debt, whereas it is loglinearized with respect to all the other variables. If we de…ne the vector containing the parameters of the model and the DSGE state vector S t , then we can rewrite the system of equations characterizing the linearized model as:
with t a vector containing the expectations errors. A model in this form in which there are no regime changes could be easily solved using the solution method for linear rational expectations models described in Sims (2002) . In the current context computations become more complicated because the model is quasi-linear, i.e. it is linear when conditioning on sp t . The solution method used in this paper is based on the work of Farmer et al. (2009) . The authors show that when a MSV solution exists, it can be characterized as a regime switching vector-autoregression of the kind studied by Hamilton (1989) and Sims and Zha (2006) :
It is worth emphasizing that the law of motion of the DSGE states depends on the structural parameters ( sp ), the regime in place ( sp t ), and the probability of moving across regimes (H sp ). This means that what happens under regime i does not only depend on the structural parameters describing that particular regime, but also on what agents expect is going to happen under alternative regimes and on how likely it is that a regime change will occur in the future. In other words, agents'beliefs matter for the law of motion governing the economy. From now on, a more compact notation will be used: T (
The law of motion (9) can be combined with a system of observation equations. The result is a model cast in state space form:
where: and v t is a vector containing observation errors. The vector X t contains …ve observables: real GDP growth rate, GDP de ‡ator quarterly in ‡ation, annualized quarterly FFR, debt to GDP ratio on a quarterly basis, tax revenues to GDP ratio. Real GDP, the GDP de ‡ator, and the series for tax revenues are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA tables: BEA T1.1.6 L1, BEA T1.1.9 L1, total receipt T3.2, L37). The series for the FFR is obtained averaging monthly …gures downloaded from the St. Louis Fed website, whereas the series for debt is downloaded from the Dallas Fed website. The sample spans from 1954:III up to 2009:IV. For a DSGE model with …xed parameters the likelihood can be easily evaluated using the Kalman …lter and then combined with a prior distribution for the parameters. When dealing with a MS-DSGE model the Kalman …lter cannot be applied in its standard form because, given an observation for X t ; the estimate of the underlying DSGE state vector distribution is not unique. Furthermore, the standard Bayesian updating procedure that is generally used to evaluate the likelihood of Markov-switching models, cannot be applied because it relies on the assumption that Markov states are history independent. This does not occur here: Given that we do not observe S t , the probability assigned to a particular Markov state depends on the value of S t 1 , whose distribution depends on the realization of sp;t 1 . 1 These issues are handled using the methods described in Bianchi (2011 
Estimates
The benchmark model allows for a total of six regimes, three for the structural parameters and two for the stochastic volatilities. The transition matrix that enters the model and is used by agents to form expectations, H m , is assumed to coincide with the one observed by the econometrician, H sp . In order to facilitate the search for the posterior mode and reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, I …x some parameters and I assume a circular structure for the transition matrix H sp : The parameters that are …xed are the steady state for government debt (b = 1), the in ‡ation target ( = :5%), and the discount rate ( = :9985). Tight priors on these parameters would deliver similar results, but they would not help in reducing the computational burden and in facilitating the search for the posterior mode.
The priors reported in Table 1 and are symmetric across regimes, except for the response to debt under Regime 1 ( b;1 ), that is a Normal centered on :01, instead of 0. Results obtained under perfectly symmetric priors are virtually identical. However, the asymmetric prior on b;1 makes the implementation of the normalization necessary to identify the regimes easier. The results shown below are based on 600,000 Gibbs sampling replications. The …rst 50,000 draws are disregarded as burn-in and of the remaining 450,000 one every twenty draws is retained. Table 2 reports the posterior mode estimates and 90% error bands for the DSGE parameters and the transition matrices diagonal elements. by Leeper (1991) , Regime 1 corresponds to Active Monetary Policy/Passive Fiscal policy (AM/PF), the regime in which the central bank controls in ‡ation and the …scal authority is committed to stabilize debt, Regime 2 is characterized by Passive Monetary Policy and Active Fiscal policy (PM/AF), whereas the last regime implies that both policies are active (AM/AF). If taken in isolation, the …rst two regimes would imply determinacy, whereas the third one would imply non-existence. Concerning the parameters of the Taylor rule, under Regime 1 ( sp t = 1) the Federal Funds rate reacts strongly to deviations of in ‡ation from its target. The opposite occurs under Regime 2. The degree of interest rate smoothing turns out to be quite di¤erent across the three regimes and it is remarkably low under Regime 3. This might be explained by accounting for the change in the conduct of monetary policy that occurred during the early years of the Volcker chairmanship.
As for the stochastic volatilities, Regime 2 is the High Volatility regime. Please refer to the paper for impulse responses and regime smoothed probabilities.
